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Rebellion, Government and the Scottish Response to Argyll’s Rising of 16851 
The story of the ill-fated rebellion led in mid-1685 by Archibald Campbell, 9th earl of Argyll 
against the newly-minted regime of James VII and II has several times been told.2  It was a brief 
affair.  Having on 2 May left his home-in-exile of the Dutch Republic, Argyll and a tiny flotilla of just 
three ships and about 300 men sailed circuitously via Orkney to reach Dunstaffnage on 13 May.  They 
advanced southwards along the Kintyre peninsula as far as Campbeltown, which was reached on 20 
May.  Over the succeeding weeks Argyll shifted his base twice more, first to Bute and then to 
Ellangreg Castle on Eilean Dearg island, off the southern coast of Cowal.  From this latter position the 
rebels pushed westwards through Glendaurel and over Loch Striven until, on the night of 15 June, 
they crossed Loch Long and made a dash towards Glasgow via Gare Loch and Loch Lomond.  The 
whole affair ended in a minor skirmish on the banks of the Clyde on 18 June, during which Argyll 
himself was captured.  The earl was executed twelve days later.  Faced with this short and militarily 
inglorious campaign, modern historians have concluded that Argyll’s rising was more or less 
hopeless, a reading which might explain the relative lack of attention paid to it in comparison with the 
earlier Covenanting revolt of 1679 or, particularly, the Jacobite rebellions after 1688.  It is not hard to 
understand this pessimism – from its very inception, the campaign was dogged by poor timing, 
strategic uncertainty, timorous leadership, lack of manpower and supplies and an overwhelming 
1 I would like to thank Professor Daniel Szechi for his useful comments on an earlier draft of this 
article. 
2 The classic narrative is J. Willcock, A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times: Being Life and Times of 
Archibald, 9th Earl of Argyll (1629-1685) (Edinburgh, 1907), pp. 343-430.  Amongst more recent 
accounts, the most important is P. Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War (Edinburgh, 
1998), pp. 95-102, but useful material is also available in T. Harris, Revolution: The Great Crisis of 
the British Monarchy, 1685-1720 (London, 2006), pp. 73-78; K. McAlister, ‘James VII and the 
Conduct of Scottish Politics c.1679 to c.1686’ (University of Strathclyde, PhD thesis, 2003), pp. 200-
18; R.C. Paterson, No Tragic Story: The Fall of the House of Campbell (Edinburgh, 2001), pp. 97-
138. 
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government counter attack led by John Murray, marquis of Atholl.3  However, in their anxiety to pass 
judgement upon the viability of Argyll’s rising, historians have tended to underestimate its potential 
value as a case study of social and political dynamics in late-seventeenth-century Scotland, and the 
Highlands in particular.  This article seeks to reassess the rebellion from that perspective, and it 
therefore aims neither to provide a narrative of the rising, nor an evaluation of the success of either 
Argyll’s or Atholl’s campaign.  Instead, it begins by assessing the factors inspiring support for Argyll, 
focusing particularly upon kinship and religion.  It then proceeds to consider the governmental 
response, asking how James VII’s regime sought to counter the insurgency and why it adopted these 
approaches.  
The roots of the 1685 rebellion stretched back to 1681, when Argyll had been convicted of 
treason following his refusal to take the Test Act (requiring all Scottish office holders to swear 
allegiance to the Episcopalian Church of Scotland) without qualification.  Although it is likely that 
Charles II intended to pardon Argyll, at least partially, the earl took fright and fled the country.  He 
settled first in London, where he began consorting with radical Whigs led by Anthony Ashley-
Copper, 1st earl of Shaftsbury, but from the autumn of 1682 resided in exile in Friesland.  There he 
became involved with the emigre community of both English and Scottish radicals which had 
gathered in the Netherlands, with his aim being to gain a subsidy of £30,000 Sterling to fund an 
insurrection in Scotland through which he hoped to win back his lands and position.  Argyll was never 
able to secure anything like his desired amount (eventually he had to settle for funds of around 
£10,000, most of it coming from a wealthy English sympathiser named Ann Smith), and his plans 
were uncovered by the government late in 1683, but he nevertheless remained a figure of real 
                                                          
3 These failures can be considered in light of a model of rebel effectiveness in early-modern Europe 
recently developed by Daniel Szechi.  According to Szechi (drawing upon earlier work by Allan 
Millett and Williamson Murray), rebel armies’ performances can be judged against four criteria: 
securing external support; achieving strategic goals; building infrastructure; and operational and 
tactical effectiveness.  It is difficult to conclude that Argyll succeeded in any of these areas.  D. 
Szechi, ‘Towards an Analytical Model of Military Effectiveness for the Early Modern Period: the 
Military Dynamics of the 1715 Jacobite Rebellion’, Militärgeschichtliches Zeitschrift, 72, 2014, pp. 
289-316. 
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consequence amongst the conspirators.  The opposition movement teetered on the brink of collapse 
after the failure of the Rye House Plot against Charles II in 1683, and Argyll seemed a suitably 
consequential figurehead offering some hope of survival. 
In the spring of 1685, immediately following the death of Charles and accession of James, 
Argyll’s plot became intertwined with another – that of James Scott, duke of Monmouth, illegitimate 
son of Charles, darling of the Protestant opposition to James and prospective leader of an insurrection 
in England.  Allegedly jealous of Monmouth, and certainly suspicious of his personal ambitions, 
Argyll had not initially been prepared to join forces with him, wishing instead to launch an 
independent insurrection in Scotland.  However, after sometimes heated discussions with leading 
Scottish conspirators in Rotterdam and Amsterdam, particularly Robert Ferguson and Patrick Hume, 
and after a promise from Monmouth not to name himself king unless so declared by a free Parliament, 
Argyll acquiesced.  The resultant plot envisaged Argyll leading a small diversionary attack on 
Scotland, with Monmouth, whose expedition was to leave no later than six days after Argyll’s, 
heading the main thrust into England.  The two men also co-operated in drafting complementary 
manifestos stressing the perceived arbitrary illegitimacy of the Stuart regime.  In the end, the wider 
British context counted for little; Monmouth missed the six-day departure deadline by several weeks, 
giving James almost complete freedom to crush Argyll before dealing with his nephew.  Yet this 
should not obscure the fact that, in planning if not in execution, Argyll’s rising sprang as much from 
the wider ferment of conspiratorial opposition politics as from the earl’s personal estrangement from 
the regime.4  
                                                          
4 G. Gardner, The Scottish Exile Community in the Netherlands, 1660-1690 (East Linton, 2004), pp. 
144-153; T. Harris, Restoration: Charles II and His Kingdoms 1660-1685 (London, 2005), pp. 351-
52; Hopkins, Glencoe, pp. 84-85; A.D. Kennedy, Governing Gaeldom: The Scottish Highlands and 
the Restoration State, 1660-1688 (Leiden, 2014), pp. 224-225; McAlister, ‘James VII’, pp. 113-28 
and at pp. 200-201; Paterson, No Tragic Story, pp. 53-66 and at pp. 67-82; M.S. Zook, Radical Whigs 
and Conspiratorial Politics in Late Stuart England (Pennsylvania, 1999), pp. 128-30.  The fullest 
(although by no means impartial) contemporary account of Argyll’s preparations in the spring of 1685 
is Patrick Hume, ‘Sir Patrick Hume’s Narrative of the Earl of Agyle’s Expedition’ in G.H. Rose (ed.), 
A Selection of the Papers of the Earls of Marchmont, 3 vols (London, 1831), iii, pp. 1-66, at pp. 1-34. 
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While drawing on the strength of the Whig opposition, Argyll’s rising also hoped to exploit 
disaffection within Lowland Scotland.  The earl himself was as much Lowland aristocrat as Highland 
chief, and his associates in 1685 included many Lowlanders – such as Hume and Sir John Cochran – 
who saw the rising as a chance to stimulate nationwide resistance; as John Lauder of Fountainhall put 
it, they ‘thought to have found us all alike combustible tinder, that [they] had no more adoe than to 
hold [their] match to us, and we would all blow up in a rebellion’.5  Yet Scotland in 1685 was not the 
tinder box it was to become by 1688, as the rebels discovered when they launched an exploratory 
thrust into Greenock in early June.  This action yielded only a handful of recruits – thirty by one count 
– and was sufficiently demoralising for some in the rebel command to conclude that there was little 
support to be had in Lowland Scotland.6  The likeliest bedfellows seemed to be the Covenanters of the 
south-west, and it was partly with an eye upon this constituency that Argyll’s self-justification, when 
it came, was strongly religious in tone (see below).  In the event, Argyll never got as far as the 
Covenanting heartlands and so was never able to test his rallying potential, and in any case the 
government’s robust military precautions would probably have proved overwhelming.  Yet even if the 
Covenanters had been reached, it seems unlikely that they would have risen in any numbers.  Their 
disastrous insurrection of 1679 was still too fresh in the memory, as was the brutal crackdown – 
mythologised as the ‘Killing Time’ – which had done much to break the back of Presbyterian 
resistance.  Moderate Presbyterians were reluctant to reach for their swords once more; only the most 
hard line Covenanters, principally the Cameronian sect, remained in the field.  Such individuals were 
unlikely to rise for a leader whom, by virtue of his long service in Charles II’s regime, they regarded 
as a traitor to the covenants, not to mention a leader whose declaration stopped short of promising to 
uphold covenanting principles.  By 1688, of course, Presbyterianism had recovered sufficiently to 
play a decisive role in the overthrow of James VII, thanks in no small part to that king’s ecclesiastical 
                                                          
5 John Lauder, Historical Observes of Memorable Occurents in Church and State, from October 1680 
to April 1686 ed. D. Laing (Edinburgh, 1837), p. 165. 
6 W. MacLeod (ed.), Journal of the Honourable John Erskine of Carnock, 1683-1687 (Edinburgh, 
1898), p. 124.  This expedition’s intended destination was in fact Largs, but it landed in Greenock 
instead when it became clear that Ayrshire was too heavily defended. 
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policies.  But this was in the future; the Covenanters of 1685 were scattered and demoralised, and the 
presence of a widely mistrusted aristocratic rebel would likely have done little to change that.7     
Thus, it was in western Scotland that the rising flared and failed.  Here, Argyll was never able 
to muster a large army.  Contemporary estimates varied; Gilbert Burnet and Sir John Edgeworth both 
reported a maximum size of about 2,500.  Hume advanced the figure of 1,800, while Mary Campbell, 
countess of Breadalbane suggested a mere 1,500 men.8  Similar numbers would later prove sufficient 
for the Jacobite movement to cause trouble for the Hanoverian regime, especially in 1745-46, but 
while Charles Edward had the good fortune to land in a lightly-defended Scotland whose government 
was distracted by foreign entanglements, Argyll enjoyed no such luck, and in this context his force 
was vanishingly small, more characteristic of a guerrilla band than a serious field army.9  Yet despite 
the diminutive size of the rebel grouping, questions can be asked about why those few who joined 
Argyll chose to do so.  Thanks to the in-built militarism of clan society, whereby clansmen were 
expected to provide military manpower on the call of their chief – a decaying but still undoubtedly 
powerful dynamic by the later seventeenth century – family or personal loyalty clearly had a role to 
play.  Argyll himself anticipated that the Campbells’ substantial kin and client networks in the 
western Highlands would form the kernel of his force, perhaps yielding up to 6,000 men.  
Accordingly, upon landing he immediately summoned his ‘Friends and Blood Relations’ as well as 
                                                          
7 Thomas Morer, An Account of the Present Persecution of the Church in Scotland in Several Letters 
(1690), p. 8; Lauder, Historical Observes, pp. 166-167; Wodrow, History of the Sufferings, iv, pp. 
291-293; I.B. Cowan, The Scottish Covenanters, 1660-1688 (London, 1976), pp. 128-129; Gardner, 
Scottish Exile Community, pp. 151-152; Harris, Revolution, pp. 77-78; J. Stephen, Defending the 
Revolution: The Church of Scotland 1689-1719 (Woodbridge, 2013), pp. 19-34. 
8 Gilbert Burnet, Burnet’s History of My Own Time, Part I, the Reign of Charles II, 2 vols, ed. O. Airy 
(Oxford, 1897), i, p. 295; J. Edgeworth, A true and faithful account of the Present Posture of the 
Kings army in Scotland, And Of their Defeating part of Argyles Men. Together with An Account of 
Argyles Affairs from his Landing in Dustafnage (London, 1685), p. 6; Hume, ‘Narrative’, at p. 45; J. 
Murray (ed.), Chronicles of the Atholl and Tullibardine Families, 5 vols (Edinburgh, 1908), i, p. 220. 
9 B. Lenman, The Jacobite Risings in Britain, 1689-1746 (Dalkeith, 1995), p. 249. 
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his ‘Vassals anywhere, and all within my several Jurisdictions’ to turn out in his support.10  Others 
shared this assumption; the Secret Committee of the Privy Council opined on 20 May that Argyll 
would receive little support ‘save from his own Highlanders’.11  And indeed, Argyll’s kin and tenants 
were crucial to him.  Several Campbell lairds, including Colin Campbell of Otter, Walter Campbell of 
Skipness, Angus Campbell of Kilberry and Duncan Campbell of Auchinbrek, rallied to his call, with 
the latter explicitly stating that he felt ‘bound by his charter to assist him’.12  The men of Islay – 
despite the loyalist stance of its proprietor, Sir Hugh Campbell of Cawdor – also rose, along with 
those of Cowal, Kintyre, Gigha and, to a lesser extent, Lorn.13  Thus, that Argyll was able to generate 
a rising at all owed much to his position as hereditary lord of much of the south west Highlands and 
chief of one of the largest regional families. 
Yet it was not the case that all Campbells or Campbell tenants felt an inexorable obligation to 
support their forfeited chief.  Indeed, Argyll himself was reportedly ‘discouraged ... that some, of 
whom he expected otherwise, would not come and talk with him’.14  His own son, the future 1st duke 
of Argyll, famously offered to fight against the earl, although, as a London Scot, he did so safe in the 
knowledge that he would hardly be called upon to make good his promise.  Closer to home, 
Alexander Campbell of Dunstaffnage sided with the government, as did Alexander Campbell of 
Lochinell, who told Atholl on 26 May that ‘ther is none that shall be more reddie to waite upon your 
                                                          
10 Hume, ‘Narrative’, at pp. 18-19; The Declaration and Apology of the Protestant People That is, of 
the Noblemen, Barrons, Gentlemen, Burgesses, and Commons of all sorts, Now in Armes within the 
Kingdom of Scotland (1685), p. 8. 
11 Murray, Atholl and Tullibardine, i, 200. 
12 Edgeworth, true and faithful account, p. 3; Murray, Atholl and Tullibardine, i, pp. 205-6; John 
Lauder, Historical Notices of Scottish Affairs, 2 vols ed. D. Laing (Edinburgh, 1848), ii, pp. 642-43 
and at p. 692; National Records of Scotland [hereafter NRS], Breadalbane Muniments, 
GD112/39/137/17, Secret Committee to Breadalbane, 25 May 1685. 
13 Historical Manuscripts Commission [hereafter HMC], Twelfth Report, Appendix, Part VIII.  The 
Manuscripts of the Duke of Athole and of the Earl of Home (London, 1891), p. 13 and at p. 19; Hume, 
‘Narrative’, at p. 44; MacLeod, Journal, pp. 118-19; Edgeworth, true and faithful account, p. 3 and at 
p. 5; NRS, Inveraray Sheriff Court, SC54/17/2/12/3, ‘A list of the Giya men sumonded Before the 
Liftenents deputies at Lochhead the 10 September 1685 yeirs’. 
14 Hume, ‘Narrative’, at p. 41. 
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Lordship upon advertisemente [as] I shall be’.  Several other Campbell gentlemen seem simply to 
have retreated to their homes to wait out the rebellion.15  Others adopted the age old strategy of 
covering all eventualities by splitting family loyalties; Argyll’s brother, Lord Neil Campbell, 
remained on the side of James – or, rather, he was forced to adopt this posture by virtue of his arrest 
shortly before Argyll landed – but his son did not, allowing the former to appeal for clemency after 
the rebellion with expressions of ‘grieff and sorrow’ that ‘any child of mine should be in a thing I doe 
so much abhore as being contrare to all dutie of God and man’.16  This widespread equivocation is in 
fact hardly surprising.  Although contemporaries (including Gaelic poets) often caricatured 
Highlanders as mindless drones following the dictates of their chiefs, the reality was much less clear 
cut.  Kinship certainly remained an important social glue, and membership of a particular kindred was 
still in many ways the cornerstone of Highland identity – as, indeed, it was for many in the Lowlands.  
But such considerations were growing increasingly brittle, and by the later seventeenth century it was 
obvious that political authority could no longer be sustained through kinship ties alone (if, indeed, this 
had ever been possible).  Instead, chiefly power was augmented by, for instance, forging formal 
friendships and alliances, holding office in the government bureaucracy, conspicuous consumption of 
luxury goods, courting the support of the Church, or asserting proprietary, rather than customary right 
to land.17  Clanship, in short, clothed Highland elites in an aura of innate authority but, as Argyll 
discovered to his cost and surprise, there was a limit to what this could achieve when divorced from 
the wider matrix of elite power. 
                                                          
15 Murray, Atholl and Tullibardine, i, p. 208; National Register of Archives for Scotland [hereafter 
NRAS] 234, Atholl Estates, box 29I(4), item 51, Lochinell to Atholl, 26 May 1685. 
16 E.K. Timings (ed.), Calendar of State Papers, domestic series, of the reign of James II [hereafter 
CSPDJ], 3 vols (London, 1960-72), i, pp. 172-73; NRS, GD112/39/138/11, Neil Campbell to 
Breadalbane, 16 July 1685. 
17 These issues are given fuller treatment in Kennedy, Governing Gaeldom, chapter 2.  See also K.M. 
Brown, Noble Power in Scotland from the Reformation to the Revolution (Edinburgh, 2011); A. 
Cathcart, Kinship and Clientage: Highland Clanship 1451-1609 (Leiden, 2006); R.A. Dodgshon, 
From Chiefs to Landlords: Social and Economic Change in the Western Highlands and Islands, 
c.1493-1820 (Edinburgh, 1998); A.I. Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-
1788 (East Linton, 1996). 
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The complexities of kinship in determining loyalties are perhaps best exemplified by the 
response of John Campbell, 1st earl of Breadalbane.  Despite his clan ties to Argyll, there was never 
much question but that Breadalbane would throw his weight firmly behind the government.  As early 
as 20 May, he undertook to arm 700-800 of his tenants to augment the government’s forces, and he 
also offered to exploit his personal authority by going on a charm offensive in Argyllshire to inhibit 
any equivocators from joining the rebels.  In addition, he repeatedly proffered his own lands as a 
loyalist mustering point – his favoured site was a large meadow on the banks of Loch Awe.18  Indeed, 
along with Patrick Stewart of Bellechin, Breadalbane established himself as one of Atholl’s key 
advisors and lieutenants during the course of the crisis.  The government showed itself very grateful 
for this assistance.  On 23 May, the Secret Committee praised Breadalbane for demonstrating ‘proper 
zeal for one of your quality and interest for so good a Master’, and another letter on 25 May declared 
that ‘your lordship does exceeding weell to be full in your letters to us as also in your other diligences, 
wee approve youw in it’.  By June, Atholl was being advised that, because Breadalbane had ‘at least a 
thousand men in action which few or none hath’, his lands, including his distant Caithness estates, 
should be spared any future requisitioning.19 
Explanations for Breadalbane’s support for the government are not difficult to find.  His 
dealings with Argyll had been strained for much of the Restoration, not least because he disapproved 
of the drawn out campaign Argyll had fought in the 1670s and 1680s to secure control over the island 
of Mull, a move which he felt threatened not only to destabilise the Highlands but also to damage the 
reputation of the Campbells.20  The relationship between the two men had been further soured by 
                                                          
18 W. Fraser (ed.), The Earls of Cromartie: Their Kindred, Country and Correspondence, 2 vols 
(Edinburgh, 1874), i, p. 44; HMC, Athole, p. 20. 
19 NRS, GD112/39/137/15, Secret Committee to Breadalbane, 23 May 1685; NRS, GD112/39/137/17, 
Secret Committee to Breadalbane, 25 May 1685; NRS, GD112/39/138/2, Secret Committee to Atholl, 
5 June 1685. 
20 NRS, GD112/39/125/6, Lawers to Glenorchy, 18 January 1679; NRS, GD112/39/127/6, Lawers to 
Glenorchy, 7 May 1679; NRS, GD112/39/127/11, Glenorchy to Moray, 26 May 1679; NRS, 
GD112/39/127/14, Lawers to Glenorchy, 28 May 1679; NRAS1209, Papers of the Campbell Family, 
Dukes of Argyll, bundle 46 and at bundle 101.  
  9 
Breadalbane’s tenacious social climbing, particularly his pursuit of an earldom, first in Caithness and 
then, after 1681, in Breadalbane itself.  Argyll was deeply suspicious that this new, upstart Campbell 
earl wished to challenge his own dominance over the kindred, concern betrayed in a letter of 1680 
regarding Caithness’ (as he then was) title: 
 
I understand Dominus de Campbello to be of Lands called Campbell but I understand 
Dominus Campellus to be Dominus Campbellorum primus and this I doe pretend to and will 
not willingly allow Dominus Campbellorum to any other ... let us not differ about words and 
names seing you may helpe it nobody will deny you nor your son Campbell as a surname but 
as a title I cannot agree.21 
 
As well as having good reason for remaining distant from Argyll, Breadalbane had done well out of 
the Restoration regime.  By the end of the 1670s he was arguably second only to Argyll himself as the 
government’s favoured agent on Highland business.  This pre-eminence was only enhanced by the fall 
of Argyll in 1681, a position exemplified by the fact that Breadalbane was the only nobleman 
appointed to the commission for pacifying the Highlands, the main organ of Highland government 
from 1682, whose activities he came increasingly to dominate.  Crucially, this pre-eminence owed 
much to the support of James VII himself, to whom, as Duke of Albany, Breadalbane had made a 
personal submission in 1683, in return receiving valuable protection from a number of potentially 
dangerous legal challenges.22  Breadalbane, in other words, had little to gain by turning against a 
friendly government simply in order to support a less-than-friendly kinsman. 
Despite Breadalbane’s firmly loyalist posture, the inconvenient fact of his kinship to the rebel 
leader could not completely be ignored.  Onlookers often assumed that his loyalties were at least 
potentially divided.  This suspicion was subtly but unmistakably referenced in a letter written to 
Breadalbane by Lady Essex Griffin, his niece, urging him to involve his son and heir, Lord 
Glenorchy, in the campaign against Argyll: 
                                                          
21 NRS, GD112/39/131/4, Argyll to Glenorchy, 24 May 1680. 
22 See Kennedy, Governing Gaeldom, chapter 6. 
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We hear you are gone towards the Highlands, where God preserve your person … My Lord 
Arran and his Brother doe dayly declare they will goe into Scotland the first hour the King 
receives intelligence off the bold Rebells making any Considerable Advance I cannot hear 
this without some little Emulation uppon My Lord Glenarchy’s account, who I soe much wish 
should rather give then follow a brave and loyall Example.23 
 
Even if Breadalbane himself remained loyal, questions were still asked about the men he led.  At a 
clandestine meeting of disaffected gentlemen from Cowal toward the end of May, it was suggested 
that many of Breadalbane’s men were secretly sympathetic towards Argyll and might be ripe for 
recruitment to the rebel cause.  The Secret Committee found these claims so plausible that they wrote 
to Atholl strenuously advising him to exercise caution.24  There is in fact no firm evidence that 
Breadalbane faced such dissention, and certainly none that it undermined his contribution to the 
government war effort.  But the fact that gossip existed at all reflects not only widespread and 
enduring suspicion that clanship was inherently subversive, but also the central importance of kinship 
as a recruiting agent for Argyll. 
Nonetheless, support for Argyll could be rooted in issues other than clan obligation.  Fear was 
one; Breadalbane noted in late May that many of Argyll’s adherents had joined him simply in order to 
protect their livestock from destruction.25  This, of course, became a handy excuse after Argyll’s 
defeat, as in the case of more than forty erstwhile rebels later tried on Islay: 
 
The pannellis all of them acknowledged ther going out of Ila with the late Argyll, but were 
compelled by force and fear, being threatened with fyre and sword by ane number of armed 
men … They had not the lest prejudice against the king or government, and in evidence therof 
they made ther escape and deserted him from tyme to tyme as occasion offered.26 
 
As well as those allegedly forced into rebellion, Argyll’s small army contained some adventurers or 
other individuals seeking personal gain – men like James Omer, identified after the rebellion as 
                                                          
23 NRS, GD112/39/137/22, Lady Essex Griffin to Breadalbane, 28 May 1685. 
24 HMC, Athole, p. 13 and at p. 14. 
25 Ibid., p. 20. 
26 C. Innes (ed.), The Book of the Thanes of Cawdor (Edinburgh, 1859), p. 373. 
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someone who ‘took severall horses both from loyall persones and lykewayes from rebells’.27  It was 
even suggested that some merely turned out in order to acquire the new weapons being distributed by 
Argyll, melting away once they had acquired their guns.28  The rebel-cum-bandit was a common sight 
– during Argyll’s time on Bute, according to the rebel and diarist John Erskine of Carnock, the 
‘Highlanders ... committed many abuses, by plundering people’s houses, killing and hoching kine 
sheep and lambs’ – and it persisted beyond the point of defeat.29  William Douglas, 3rd duke of 
Hamilton suggested at the end of June that a military presence remained necessary on his lands 
because they had still not been ‘fried of the highlanders’.  Even a month later, the Treasurer, William 
Douglas, 1st duke of Queensberry, was still complaining of ‘sculking Rebells’ who had not 
submitted.30  That some of Argyll’s erstwhile partisans remained active weeks after the dispersal of 
the rebel force might suggest that they were simply waiting to see how the wider political situation 
developed, but it might also imply that it was plunder, not principle which was uppermost in their 
minds. 
But these were all minority concerns.  Aside from kinship, only one other motivating factor 
might be described as significant.  Allan Macinnes has demonstrated that religious affiliation was a 
major factor in determining Highland loyalties during periods of Jacobite activity, and while it would 
be difficult to make the same claim for Argyll’s rising, the religious dimension should be 
acknowledged.31  In the declaration which he famously had printed and distributed shortly after 
landing in Scotland, Argyll was careful to present his motivation as religious.  Ever since the 
Restoration, he claimed, Charles II and James VII (the latter referred to only as the ‘Duke of York’ in 
token of the rebels’ rejection of his kingship) had been engaged in a diabolical plot to undo the godly 
reforms of the Covenanters, relying upon arbitrary and tyrannical expedients to reintroduce Popery.  
Having thus justified rebellion, the declaration proceeded to set out three broad aims: a true and pure 
                                                          
27 NRS, SC54/17/4/2/3, ff. 1-2. 
28 Macleod, Journal, p. 125; Hume, ‘Narrative’, at p. 42 and at p. 53. 
29 Macleod, Journal, p. 122. 
30 NRS, Hamilton Papers, GD406/1/3324, Queensberry to Arran, 23 July 1685; NRS, GD406/1/7551, 
Hamilton to Arran, 30 June 1685. 
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Presbyterian Church would be established; Popery and idolatry would be eradicated; and the 
mechanisms of arbitrary power would be dismantled.32  While arguably not as audacious as the 
manifesto later produced by Monmouth – not least because Argyll, while implicitly rejecting James 
VII’s right to the throne, offered no overt programme for replacing the king with another claimant – 
Argyll’s was still a bold and uncompromising declaration which cast him as a Presbyterian champion.  
This message was further emphasised by the banners created for his army, which bore the motto ‘For 
the Protestant Religion’ and ‘Against Popery, Prelacy and Erastianism’, and by Argyll’s personally 
pious behaviour, especially during the final hours of his life.33   
The rebels’ overtly spiritual and nonconformist posture has sometimes been described as a 
mistake, not just because their radicalism alienated moderate opinion, but also because, in the words 
of Patrick Hume, religion ‘was no motive to the Highland comons, for they neither understood nor 
valued’ it.34  Yet – no doubt taking its cue at least in part from the earl himself – Argyllshire boasted a 
rather more vibrant dissenting tradition than is sometimes allowed.  There was for example a 
staunchly Presbyterian community clustered around Campbeltown in the presbytery of Kintyre, while 
the neighbouring presbytery of Dunoon became well known during the Restoration as a site of intense 
conventicling activity, especially around Strathmore.35  Accordingly, there are some indications that 
religion may have been a motivating factor for some of Argyll’s supporters.  At a lieutenancy court 
held shortly after the rebellion, testimony was collected about two ‘seditious sermons’ allegedly held 
by the rebels at Lochhead (Campbeltown) on 21 and 24 May.36  The local minister, David Simpson, 
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reported that most of the ethnically Lowland population had withdrawn from the parish church in 
order to attend these meetings, and it was further suggested by several witnesses that a number of 
children had been illegally baptised.  In the end, enough evidence was found to fine nearly 100 people 
for attending these sermons.37  Later, in October, an additional sixteen individuals were cited for 
communing with outlawed preachers.38  That all of this was happening in one of the more 
conventionally nonconformist parts of Argyllshire indicated that, while Argyll’s message of a 
Presbyterian crusade was hardly likely to attract a stampede of supporters from the Highlands 
generally, it could be an effective means of reinforcing his appeal within certain sectors of his 
heartlands. 
 If patterns of support for Argyll’s cause reveal something of the dynamics of Scottish society 
in the later seventeenth century, the nature of the loyalist response is equally suggestive.  The 
government had been expecting some kind of insurrection from Argyll ever since his forfeiture and 
flight in 1681, and indeed throughout the early 1680s various efforts had been made to secure 
Argyllshire from potential rebel attack, most significantly by granting Atholl a lieutenancy to secure 
the shire in 1684.39  However, preparations grew much more intense in the months following James’ 
accession in February 1685, as intelligence about Argyll’s imminent rising began to trickle in.  A 
proclamation of 28 April put the kingdom in a posture of defence, and in particular placed shire 
militias (where extant) and fencible men on alert.  The militia was formally called out on 9 May.  On 
11 May, a general muster of all heritors with more than £100 valued rent was called, and eight days 
later this was extended to cover all heritors.40  According to one estimate, these call ups, combined 
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with the regular army, produced a nominal force of 60,000 men.41 All this is reflective of the single 
most striking trend in Scottish governance in the later seventeenth century, namely the rising military 
capacity of the Scottish state.  The military was always the largest item of public expenditure during 
the reigns of Charles II and James VII; this only paid for a modest standing army (up to about 3,000-
strong) and a handful of garrisons, but was augmented by the creation in 1668-69 of the militia, a 
means of maintaining armed forces at private, rather than public expense.42  Such militarism, amply 
borne out by the massive mobilisation orders of 1685, underpins Maurice Lee’s suggestion that 
Restoration Scotland was controlled by ‘an arbitrary regime dependent on military force’.43 
Lee’s thesis is compelling, but it should not obscure the fact that, on account of mundane 
administrative and financial challenges, the government was never quite as militarily strong in 
practice as it seemed in theory.44  In part because of this, the Restoration regime had developed a track 
record of raising and exploiting irregular forces, especially from the Highlands.  Highland recruitment 
into the standing army seems to have been minimal, and Highlanders had been thought so unreliable 
that the militia was seriously under developed in the Highland shires, but it was judged safe 
periodically to exploit the armed retinues of senior chiefs as augmentation for the government’s own 
power – the infamous ‘Highland Host’ of 1678, incorporating Highlanders levied by the earls of 
Atholl, Moray, Perth, Mar and Caithness (later Breadalbane), was only the most obvious example.45  
This tendency was also reflected in the response to Argyll.  On 17 May, just after the rebel landing, 
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the Privy Council dispatched letters to fourteen Highland chiefs asking them to raise a total of 4,200 
troops from amongst their tenants and dependents.  George Gordon, 1st duke of Gordon was given the 
largest burden – 600 men – as well as nominal command of the clan levies, but substantial contingents 
were also expected from John Mackenzie, master of Tarbat, George Gordon, lord Strathnaver, 
Kenneth Mackenzie, 3rd earl of Seaforth, George Sinclair, 6th earl of Caithness, and the chiefs of the 
MacLeans, Grants, Frasers of Lovat, MacDonalds of Glengarry, MacDonalds of Clanranald, 
MacDonalds of Sleat, Camerons of Lochiel and Mackintoshes.46  All this, of course, was over and 
above the several hundred mean already offered by Breadalbane and the 2,000 or so promised by 
Atholl himself, who, in his continuing capacity as lieutenant of Argyllshire, retained overall control of 
the campaign on the ground.47 
The theoretically enormous muster enacted to counter Argyll was however undermined by a 
number of factors, not least strategic considerations.  The Secret Committee revealed its thinking in a 
letter to Breadalbane on 23 May: 
 
As to the forces in the west wee are of opinion that they are more usefull at present in the 
west then with yow, our reasones are, that certainly Marquis Atholl ... will be hard enough for 
all that argyle can, and more than he designs to out in that place; and there is great ground for 
your lordhips opinion that if he have any designe of consequenc it most be in air-shyre or 
Galloway and therfor a good levy in all prudence is to be posted there.48 
 
This stance originated with the king himself.  James was convinced that the Argyllshire landings were 
a distraction, and that the real attack – and the real danger – lay in a potential rising of the disaffected 
Covenanters of the south west.49  He focused, therefore, on using his formal military resources to 
block the rebels’ path south; the regular army was permitted to advance no closer than Glasgow, while 
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the bulk of the militia remained stationed around Ayrshire and Renfrewshire.50  This preoccupation 
with hemming Argyll in was confirmed repeatedly over the course of the crisis.  At the start of June, 
having already reported that all the passes from Argyllshire into the Lowlands were guarded, the new 
commander-in-chief, George Douglas, 1st earl of Dumbarton occupied himself moving his men 
towards Largs so as to repel a rumoured rebel landfall in Ayrshire.  Later, in mid-June, upon receiving 
reports that Argyll was preparing to break towards Stirling, the Secret Committee intemperately 
implored Atholl to attack, while also hurriedly moving the militia of Clackmannanshire to reinforce 
the town.51  
Resource management likewise demonstrated that the government was determined to keep its 
main muscle in reserve to protect the Lowlands.  Supplies were low; the Secret Committee ruefully 
reported on 21 May that ‘things are not as wee would desyre in provisiones’, and George Mackenzie, 
1st viscount of Tarbat went so far as to suggest that ‘necessity of dissipating for want of bread’ was a 
genuine concern.52  Emergency measures therefore proved necessary.  A one off tax (equivalent to 
one and three quarter months of cess, the main land tax of the Restoration) was levied on the burghs, 
and orders were given for requisitioning all excess food supplies in Ross-shire and Morayshire.53  In 
this way, victual to a value exceeding £8,200 was successfully stockpiled in the main storehouse at 
Stirling Castle.  But all of this did Atholl little good, since the government was determined that the 
bulk of these resources be reserved for the standing army and militia.  Thus, only £384 worth of 
Stirling’s meal ever found its way to Atholl – and even then, it was only released on 15 June and 
amounted to less than half of the 1,000 bolls earlier promised.  To assist Atholl in the meantime, 
commission was given to Sir Patrick Threepland, collector of the cess in Perthshire, to requisition 
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supplies within that sheriffdom.  He provided 1,134 bolls, taken from five leading local lairds.  There 
were other provisioning problems as well.  Repeated undertakings to provide arms from the royal 
magazine, also at Stirling Castle, came to naught, and Atholl’s force had to rely upon private 
stockpiles.  Even clothing Atholl’s men required emergency measures; a merchant named John Adam 
was given £1,500 to locate suitable attire for ‘the highelanders presently imployed in his Majesties 
service’, and he used this money to buy 1,000 pairs of shoes and 1,000 ells of plaid in Musselburgh.54  
In short, the government’s overriding concern as regards provisions was that enough be held in 
reserve to sustain the army and militia stationed in the south, a stance which reinforces the sense that 
its key strategic goal was to ensure that Argyll could not advance into the Lowlands. 
With Scotland’s formal military apparatus tied down, the active campaign came to rely almost 
exclusively on the irregular forces gathered under Atholl.  Such an approach, which placed the burden 
of home defence upon private, local resources, had obvious advantages in terms of simplicity and cost 
effectiveness, but there were other positives as well.  It is clear for instance that Atholl’s campaign 
received a significant fillip from the fact that, thanks to centuries of highly successful aggrandisement 
in the west Highlands, the Argyll Campbells had many local enemies.  For such people, siding with 
Atholl was seen as a chance to exact revenge on the hated MacCailein Mór, and nowhere was this 
impulse more gleefully reflected than in the work of the Keppoch MacDonald (and virulently anti-
Campbell) poet Iain Lom, who gloried in Argyll’s disgrace: 
  
‘S ann ort thàin’ an dà latha 
Ged bha e grathann gun tighinn, 
Fhuair thu cùirt na bu leatha 
An déidh t’athair a mhilleadh; 
Ach gun aon bhuile claidheimh, 
Gun sàthadh gatha no sgine, 
Mar gum bàidhte na coinnlean 
Chaill thu t’oighreachd ‘s do chinneach. 
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[What a change for the worse has come for you, although it was some time in coming; your 
prestige at court increased since your father was destroyed; but without a single sword blow 
or thrust of barb or dirk, as candles are extinguished, you lost your estate and kin].55 
 
Such sentiments help explain why Atholl’s force of ‘Highlanders’ included contingents from several 
families, such as the Camerons, MacLeans and MacDonalds, from whose ‘losse and misfortune’, in 
the words of the Irish Catholic missionary John Cahassay, Argyll had ‘builded up his uast estate and 
fortune’.56  As historians have long noticed, this presaged developments a few years later, when the 
Jacobite movement’s success amongst Highland families was greatly assisted by (although not wholly 
dependent upon) the Williamite stance of the Argyll Campbells.57  The comparison is far from exact, 
however.  Some of 1685’s loyalists, like the Frasers of Lovat or the Gordons of Huntly, had turned 
Jacobite by 1689, while others, like the Breadalbane Campbells or Atholl men, flirted with James’s 
cause.  Conversely, and the Williamite bent of revolutionary Argyllshire was much more pronounced 
than had been its rebelliousness three years earlier.  But if Argyll’s rising cannot be characterised as a 
simple Jacobite dry run, it is striking that the broad local divisions which would mark Highland 
Jacobitism were already more or less in place during Argyll’s rising. 
 At the same time, Atholl’s nominal strength was augmented by some seeking to use the 
rebellion as a cover for straightforward plunder.58  Indeed, so extensive was this tendency that, in the 
view of one witness, the war effort had by mid-June become little more than an exercise in mass theft: 
 
I beginne to wearie of this campaigne, since I see it is not by faire feighting wee are lyke to 
have a speedie issew of it, for I have realie to tender a hairt to take plaisore in the Lowing of 
herds of cows, and bleeting of sheip, and shriking of women folowing them in to owre camp, 
and if my honore, which I am possiblie more tender off then is nessessaire for a man in my 
sircumstances, hade not obliged me, and will still, to stay so long as I think it concerned, I 
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was never att a Lyffe more onplaisant to me, amongst such a pack as I could not have thoght 
hade been on arth.59 
 
By 2 June, the marquis was so conscious of the problem posed by ‘Thieves and Robbers’ committing 
depredations under the cover of his name that he established an armed watch between Glen Shira and 
Glenaray, designed to prevent marauders from entering Argyllshire.60  The situation was particularly 
troublesome immediately after the rebels’ defeat in late June, when the disbanding levies simply 
pillaged their way home.  The Camerons of Lochiel were especially associated with such activity, but 
reports also surfaced involving the MacGregors, MacDonalds, MacLeans, MacNaughtons and Appin 
Stewarts, as well as the contingents commanded by Lord Strathnaver and numerous individuals 
desirous of joining the feast.61  Amongst the lands badly hit were Breadalbane’s Perthshire estates, 
something about which the earl, writing to Atholl, was clearly livid:     
 
I am just now informed by my tennents in Glenorchay in Breadalbane that the brea of 
Lochaber men hav stolen ane hundreth gott from them.  For Godsak secuir us from these base 
villanes befor you leav that shyr, from these murthering base villans who never serv’d the 
King, and yet ther loyaltie must be cry’d up beyond my poor men who hav left all they hav to 
their mercie for to serv the King ... I am very angry.62 
 
The ‘Atholl raids’ caused enormous damage.  In Ardkinglass alone, destruction exceeding £60,000 
Scots were recorded.  Elsewhere losses were smaller, but still significant – £2,000 Scots in Ellengreg, 
£6,200 Scots in Rosneath, nearly £10,000 Scots in Cowal.  The cultivated woodlands around 
Inveraray Castle were later calculated to have sustained nearly £17,000 Scots of damage.63  This 
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extensive theft and destruction reflects how the lure of easy personal gain drew in supporters for the 
government. 
 The pillaging associated with the government campaign also reflects the key disadvantage of 
relying on clan levies.  These were irregular troops, many glorying in their hatred of the Campbells, 
and Atholl’s control over them was tenuous at best.  The result was not only short term chaos, but also 
longer term destabilisation, as the commissioners for pacifying the Highlands observed in May 1686: 
 
The highlands by reasone of the Late trowbles therin and the Libertie quhich the highlanders 
did then take to themselves Have casten off much of the former obedience to quhich they 
were formerly reduced.64 
 
The prominence of clan levies was potentially disadvantageous for other reasons as well.  Chiefs 
could not necessarily be relied upon to muster their men in a sufficiently timely fashion – the 
MacDoanlds of Glencoe, Stewarts of Appin and MacDougalls, all of whom were expected to join 
Atholl, had still not done so by 31 May, much to the annoyance of the Secret Committee.  Meanwhile, 
it took time to get the more northerly levies into position.  The Grant contingent, for example, was 
still in Strathspey in the first week of June, while Gordon’s men had only reached Perthshire by the 
time of Argyll’s defeat.  Neither, as a result, saw active service against the rebels.65  A perhaps more 
serious problem was raised by John Keith, 1st earl of Kintore, who warned on 30 May that Atholl 
should ‘be vpon your guard, as weill with some that ar with you as open enimies’.66  The question 
marks surrounding the loyalty of the Campbell contingents have already been noted, and there were 
also suspicions that smaller clans, like the MacAllisters or MacDougalls, might be sympathetic 
towards the rebels.  Claims of treachery also surrounded the notoriously slippery Lochiel.  It was 
alleged, not least by Argyll himself, that the Cameron chief acted as his spy in the government camp, 
relaying information either by letter or ambassador.  Lochiel later denied any such double dealing, but 
the suspicion was not helped by a number of actions on his part – such as an attack on some of 
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Atholl’s men during the night of 9-10 June, or his failure to prevent Argyll escaping from Ellengreg 
into the Lowlands five days later – which, if not treacherous, were certainly inept.67  Much of the 
speculation surrounding the loyalty of Atholl’s men was far-fetched (at one point it was even claimed, 
most implausibly, that the MacLeans, who had spent much of Restoration locked in a bitter feud with 
the Campbells, would be willing to join Argyll), and some of it was no doubt based upon rebel 
misinformation, but that it existed at all demonstrates the essential instability of the loose coalition 
fighting under Atholl. 
Reliance upon personal levies also complicated central supervision of the war effort.  Having 
decided to hold both the regular army and the militia in reserve and instead out-source the conflict to 
Atholl and other local elites, the government’s own role was largely limited to its hit-and-miss efforts 
to provide supplies, and to offering intelligence; it was for instance the Secret Committee which 
informed Atholl on 30 May of a supposed plot on the part of the gentleman of Cowal to feign 
desertion from Argyll, infiltrate the loyalist camp and undermine its war effort by spreading 
misinformation or stimulating desertions.68  The only significant government contribution came not 
from Scotland, but from England, in the form of a small fleet of five ships of the Royal Navy 
dispatched by the king.  Having already worked to secure the south west coast, these had by early 
June succeeded in blockading Argyll’s tiny flotilla at Ellengreg, which castle they bombarded and 
captured on 15 June.69 
Otherwise, the government was reduced to shouting suggestions from the sidelines.  Although 
official advice (especially from Dumbarton) repeatedly warned Atholl not to engineer too hasty a 
confrontation, growing impatience as the rebellion progressed led the government to urge a more 
punitive and aggressive stance.  On 20 May, the Secret Committee ordered Inveraray to be burned, 
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along with the homes of all rebels.  On 27 May, Tarbat, believing that an overly timid approach would 
allow Argyll either to fortify himself at Tarbert or escape into the south western shires, pointedly 
advised Atholl that ‘if yee fight him and beat him, that is the best of all’.70  More orders from the 
Secret Committee on 31 May demanded that Atholl kill anybody not actively assisting him.  By 15 
June, the Chancellor, James Drummond, 1st earl of Perth, was complaining to Breadalbane that ‘uee 
long to hear you have got that little wildcat ferretted out of Argyle or Els beat for it keeps heart in 
some folks, that it Is so long of Doing’.71  Indeed, Perth’s bloodlust survived the defeat of rebels; on 
23 June he ordered the execution of all Argyllshire’s rebellious heritors, as well as exemplary 
execution of 100 of the ‘chief ringleaders of the tennents’.72  Atholl sensibly ignored this instruction.   
The government’s tendency towards issuing histrionic orders was in part a reaction to 
Atholl’s generally cautious strategy.  He was at pains to avoid engaging too early, and certainly not 
until he had merged his own levies with Breadalbane’s and the small garrison force stationed under 
Bellechin at Inveraray.73  He did not reach Argyllshire until early June, at which point he stationed his 
force at Inveraray and remained there for nearly a fortnight, not wishing to move lest doing so provide 
an opening for Argyll to slip past, either deeper into Argyllshire or into the Lowlands.74  In this, 
Atholl was heartily supported by Breadalbane, who recognised that time was on the government’s 
side and therefore argued (not least to the overly belligerent Bellachin) that a defensive posture was 
most appropriate.75  But such a strategy looked very strange from Edinburgh, where it was always 
expected, as Hamilton put it on 8 June, that ‘some ingagment betuixt [Argyll] and Atholl’ was 
imminent; indeed, Kintore repeatedly warned that Atholl’s caution gave his enemies ample 
ammunition maliciously to question his ability and resolve as a general.76  Government frustration 
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was rendered more acute by a lack of reliable intelligence (a dearth which the Council attempted to 
fill in early June by having the magistrates of both Kilsyth and Linlithgow create a temporary system 
of horse relays to shuttle information between Glasgow and Edinburgh), but also by a sense of 
powerlessness, as betrayed on 31 May when the Secret Committee told Breadalbane ‘wee can give no 
orders but leave all to God and your Conduct’.77  Arms-length oversight of this kind was a natural 
consequence of the ‘fog of war’, especially when the campaign involved dispatching an irregular 
force into a peripheral region, yet the steadily rising hysteria which characterised the government’s 
interaction with Atholl suggest that it  found such constraint deeply uncomfortable. 
As well as overseeing the military campaign, it fell to Atholl, in his capacity as lieutenant of 
Argyllshire, to oversee the wider pacification of the region.  Notwithstanding Perth’s call for a course 
of exemplary executions, Atholl’s activities were relatively restrained.  Already on 8 June he had 
drafted a proclamation of indemnity, offering pardon to all of the ‘commons of those tua Shyres of 
Argyll and Tarbert’ who had been ‘forced and prest by the rebells to Joyne with them’, providing they 
laid down their arms and swore an oath of allegiance.  Twenty nine copies of this declaration were 
ordered to be distributed across the region – nine in the division of Kintrye, eight in Argyll, seven in 
Cowal and five in Lorne.78  On 14 July, after Argyll’s defeat, Atholl issued an order requiring all 
ministers to compile lists of rebels within their parishes – the resulting registers named 1,081 
individuals.79  Some of these (just over 200 people) were dealt with, principally by means of fining 
and forfeiture, through a series of lieutenancy courts at Lochhead and Mull, presided over by Atholl’s 
deputies (Bellechin, John Boyle of Kelburne and John MacNachtan, sheriff depute of Argyllshire) 
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between August and November.  Simultaneously, Atholl borrowed a central plank of wider 
Restoration Highland policy by demanding, on 8 September, that all ‘Heretors Freeholders 
Woodsetters Lyfrenters and Tacksmen’ offer bonds for the peaceable behaviour of their dependents as 
well as assuming responsibility for spoliations committed by them during the rebellion itself – a 
policy which attracted vehement protest from some Campbell lairds who regarded it as a ‘too sevear 
measure of Iustice’.80  The government would continue to regard Argyllshire with suspicion for much 
of the remainder of James VII’s reign, but by the end of 1685 it felt sufficiently confident to allow 
Atholl’s lieutenancy to lapse in favour of resurrecting the commission of pacifying the Highlands.  
The marquis himself, despite attempted reassurance from Melfort, regarded this as a personal snub 
engineered by his enemies.81 
The comparatively muted reprisals which followed in the wake of the rebels’ defeat reflect 
the general insignificance of the threat posed by Argyll.  Despite genuine concern in the opening 
months of 1685, his rebellion had never really presented a significant challenge, and to that extent, 
historians are right to have paid it scant attention.  Yet if Argyll’s rising was a damp squib, it revealed 
in its failure much about the socio-political dynamics of late-seventeenth-century Scotland, and the 
Highlands in particular.  Argyll, along with many other observers, seems to have assumed that his 
position as the major clan chief in the western Highlands would be sufficient to sustain a major 
campaign – that, in effect, he could lead a clan rising.  But in this he was seriously mistaken, because 
Highland society was already by the later seventeenth century well advanced in the process of 
locating clanship within a much broader matrix of formal and informal power; the ties of kin were 
now routinely supplemented by other sources of authority, such as formal possession of landed titles, 
service in the government bureaucracy, religious engagement (usually, but not always through the 
established Church of Scotland), residence in Edinburgh and/or London, and conspicuous 
consumption – exactly the same strategies, in fact, which marked lordly authority elsewhere in 
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Scotland.  Certainly the Gaelic side of Argyll’s identity offered him some scope for mustering a force 
of dependents, but the unspectacular progress of his rising demonstrated that clanship alone was no 
longer enough to guarantee power in the Highlands, far less in Scotland more generally.  
Similarly, the government’s response to Argyll said much about the nature and development 
of the Restoration regime.  Ever since 1660, Charles II’s monarchy had been working to equip itself 
with the ideological and coercive trappings of absolutism.  This was a multi-faceted project which 
involved developments in several areas, including heightened parliamentary management, judicial 
stringency, tighter censorship and heavier taxation, but its key prop was a greatly expanded, if still by 
international standards fairly modest military establishment.  The famous boast of John Maitland, 
duke of Lauderdale to Charles II that there was never ‘a king so absolute as you are in poor old 
Scotland’ may have been an exaggeration, but not grossly so.82  Yet for all its absolutist pretensions, 
the government’s resources were limited and it remained dependent upon the support and co-
operation of local elites to keep the wheels of state turning.  The campaign of 1685 neatly 
encapsulated this dichotomy.  Despite a theoretically enormous mobilisation, general reluctance to 
risk scarce resources meant that frontline resistance was outsourced entirely to the irregular forces 
commanded by Atholl, who enjoyed precious little material support from, or oversight by, central 
authorities.  Argyll, in short, may not have come close to overthrowing the Restoration regime, but his 
rebellion did highlight an on-going convergence between Highland and Lowland lordship, while also 
disrupting the facade of Stuart absolutism to expose the compromise between central and local power 
which remained at the heart of political life in Scotland.  
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